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Seeing Isn’t Believing: Ahlquist v. City 
of Cranston and the Constitutionality 
of Religious Displays Under the 
Establishment Clause 
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The latest casualty in the battle over religion in public schools 
is a banner that formerly adorned the halls of Cranston West High 
School.  The banner was donated to the school by an alumnus in 
1963 and contains the phrases: “Our Heavenly Father” and 
“Amen.”1  The banner was painted onto the walls of Cranston 
West and remained there without incident for over four decades.2  
The ACLU began a concerted effort to remove the banner in 2010, 
and a Cranston West High School student, Jessica Ahlquist, sued 
the City of Cranston in 2011 (with the assistance of the ACLU) for 
creating an unconstitutional establishment of religion.3  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Rhode Island sided with Ahlquist 
and ordered the banner’s removal in Ahlquist v. City of Cranston.4 
In the religious display context, the Supreme Court’s case law 
can be divided into two kinds of cases.  First are what I call “active 
endorsement” cases, where a person (usually a student) is forced 
 
 * Staff Attorney, Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP; LL.M, Suffolk 
University Law School; J.D. Roger Williams University School of Law.  
Thank you to Malorie Diaz and Kaitlin Morton-Bentley for their thoughts, 
insights, and careful editing. 
 1.  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (D.R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 512. 
 4.  Id. at 526. 
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to take part in, or listen to, religious conduct.  Second are cases 
like Ahlquist, where plaintiffs view publically accessible objects or 
displays containing religious language or themes.  I call these 
“passive viewing” cases. 
In this Article, I argue that the Ahlquist Court incorrectly 
held that the banner was an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion. I additionally contend that the logic underlying passive 
viewing cases is flawed.  Plaintiffs like Ahlquist should not have 
standing to pursue Establishment Clause cases where their injury 
is limited to the mere viewing of an object.  Finally, I offer some 
ways in which Establishment Clause litigation can be reformed 
while respecting the standing requirement of the Constitution. 
In Section II, I examine the Establishment Clause and how it 
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  The Court’s case law– which, by all 
accounts, is inconsistent – is organized into the categories of active 
endorsement and passive viewing.  Section III analyzes the U.S. 
District Court’s Ahlquist opinion, paying attention to the Court’s 
interpretation of Establishment Clause case law.  Section IV 
argues that passive viewing challenges such as Ahlquist should 
not be entertained by courts on standing and policy grounds.  
Section V is a brief conclusion. 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Establishment Clause, part of the 1791 Bill of Rights, 
reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . .”5  The Establishment Clause is one of two 
constitutional clauses concerning religious practice.  The second, 
dubbed the Free Exercise Clause, provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . .  prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”6  The 
precise relationship between the clauses has been the subject of 
much debate.  The prevalent understanding is that the clauses 
operate independently, with the Establishment Clause preventing 
the creation of a state religion and the Free Exercise Clause 
prohibiting discrimination against any religious group. 
In seeking to apply the Establishment Clause to 
contemporary disputes, two questions arise: first, what did the 
 
 5.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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founders mean by establishment of religion?  Second, irrespective 
of this original understanding, how has this clause been 
interpreted over time? 
A. The Intent Behind the Establishment Clause 
No one can precisely say what the founders meant when they 
prohibited laws “respecting” an “establishment” of religion.  The 
Establishment Clause received little debate at the First Session of 
Congress in 1789.7  The House and Senate generally supported it, 
and the only criticism directed at the religion clauses was that 
they were superlative because Congress did not have the power to 
enact religious legislation.8  In spite of this criticism, the religion 
clauses enjoyed broad congressional support.9 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s modern Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence began in 1940, when the Supreme Court held that 
the Establishment Clause was “incorporated” into the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applicable to the states.10  This led to the 
proliferation of lawsuits against school districts, as schools proved 
to be the most frequent place that Americans encountered state-
supported religious displays and rituals. 
As Justice Hugo Black noted in Everson v. Board of 
Education, it is generally accepted that the Establishment Clause 
protects against the following things: “Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another  [and] [n]o person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing beliefs or disbeliefs . . .”11 Arguments beyond this, 
however, are a matter of contention.  The vagueness of the 
Establishment Clause lends itself toward differing 
interpretations. 
The Supreme Court has issued a number of Establishment 
 
 7.  See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 76-79 (1986). 
 8.  Id. at 79, 89. 
 9.  Id. at 89. 
 10.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 11.  330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
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Clause opinions, many of them in the public school context.12  The 
facts, rationales, and holdings of these opinions are inconsistent.  
Generally, the Court has proved hostile to anything containing 
references to the Christian religion or God.  This hostility is 
slightly lessened outside of the school context.  In order to bring a 
measure of clarity to this body of case law, I have organized the 
Court’s opinions into two groups; cases involving: (1) the active 
endorsement of religion; and (2) the passive viewing of objects 
with religious language or significance.  Examples of these 
scenarios are explored more fully below, with special attention 
given to passive viewing cases such as Ahlquist. 
1.  Active Endorsement 
Active endorsement cases involve situations where a student 
is required to say or do something that reflects a religious belief he 
or she does not hold.  This can include forced attendance at an 
event where others recite prayers or read religious texts.  The 
most famous example of this is the 1962 opinion of Engel v. 
Vitale,13 where a group of ten students challenged the New Hyde 
Park, New York School District’s recitation of a prayer at the 
beginning of the school day.  The prayer was: “Almighty God, we 
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings 
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”14  The Court 
held that the overtly religious nature of the prayer rendered it 
unconstitutional.15 
Another example of endorsement from the post-war era is the 
1963 case of School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania 
 
 12.  Establishment Clause challenges come up in a wide variety of 
contexts beyond public displays and practices.  For example, there is a wide 
body of case law on the issue of public funding of religious schools.  See, e.g., 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.  These cases are beyond 
the scope of this Article, which focuses on Establishment Clause challenges to 
governmental practices or displays. 
 13.  370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962). 
 14.  Id. at 422. 
 15.  Id. at 425 (“[I]t is no part of the business of government to compose 
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a 
religious program carried on by government.”).  Also, although students could 
remain silent or leave the room, the Court declared that the religious nature 
of the prayer, in and of itself, violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 430. 
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v. Schempp.16  Schempp was a consolidation of two cases 
challenging laws in Pennsylvania and Baltimore requiring 
readings from the (Christian) Holy Bible and a recitation of the 
Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each school day.17  As in Engel, 
participation in either of these events was voluntary, and children 
could opt out of the process.18  Nevertheless, after a lengthy 
review of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
Court had little trouble concluding that these readings violated 
the Establishment Clause.19 
In the recent case of Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School 
District, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered and 
rejected a challenge to a California law requiring that public 
school students recite the Pledge of Allegiance.20  Most public 
schools require or recommend that children stand and recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance at the beginning of the school day.  Plaintiff 
Michael Newdow and several other parents and children 
challenged a California statute requiring recitation of the Pledge 
of Allegiance.21  The plaintiffs’ challenge to Congress’s 1954 
Amendment to the Pledge (which added the words “under God”) 
was tossed out on standing grounds since the Amendment did not 
require students to recite the Pledge.22  However, the Court found 
standing under the California law, since several plaintiffs were 
children forced to recite the Pledge or silently remain in the 
classroom and tacitly endorse its message.23  On the merits of the 
case, the Ninth Circuit found that the Pledge of Allegiance had 
secular aims and was not an establishment of religion.24 
Finally, in the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme 
Court held that a Rhode Island middle school graduation speech 
by a religious official (a Rabbi) containing references to “God” and 
 
 16.  374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 17.  Id. at 205. 
 18.  Students were required to obtain written permission in order to opt 
out.  Id. at 205, 211-12. 
 19.  Id. at 223. 
 20.  597 F.3d 1007, 1007-42 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 21.  As well as the Rio Linda Union School District’s policy implementing 
of the statute.  Id. at 1012-23. 
 22.  Id. at 1016. 
 23.  Id. at 1018.  On the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit found that 
the Pledge of Allegiance had secular aims and was not an establishment of 
religion.  Id. at 1034-42. 
 24.  Id. at 1034-42.   
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the word “Amen” violated the Establishment Clause.25  The Court 
indicated that the use of the prayer in front of school children had 
a “coercive” effect and that the Court must employ a heightened 
sensitivity when analyzing Establishment Clause challenges in 
the K-12 context.26  Unlike Engel, the Court addressed the issue of 
whether the students who chose to remain in attendance suffered 
a real injury.27  They do, the Court reasoned, because forcing 
dissenters to listen to a state-organized religious speech is 
functionally the same as making them speak out loud.  As in 
Engel and Schempp, students were given the option of not 
attending the ceremony.  The Court held that this was not a 
meaningful option, since the vast majority of students want to 
attend their high school graduations.28 
2.  Passive Viewing 
Passive viewing opinions, like Ahlquist, involve litigation 
where a plaintiff has viewed an object that has some connection to 
a religious tradition.  Often, as described more fully below, the 
“injuries” described by plaintiffs are emotional in nature and 
unverifiable. 
 One of the most well-known passive viewing cases is Lynch v. 
Donnelly, another Establishment Clause case originating in Rhode 
Island.29  Lynch involved a holiday display put on by the City of 
Pawtucket.  The display, put on for over 40 years before it was 
challenged, featured a variety of secular displays including 
“Santa’s House, inhabited by a live Santa who distributed 
candy[,] . . . four large, five-pointed stars covered with small white 
electric lights[, and] three painted wooden Christmas tree 
 
 25.  505 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1992). 
 26.  Id. at 592. 
 27.  Id. at 593. 
 28.  Id. at 594-95.  Consider also Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. 
Doe, a substantially similar challenge to student-initiated, student-led prayer 
preceding high school football games.  530 U.S. 290 (2000).  The District 
argued that because the prayer was privately initiated, it constituted private 
speech immune from government regulation.  The Court rejected this 
argument, finding that the state was indeed involved with the school prayer 
(the school had a policy on the topic) and, in any event, the speaker(s) used 
public resources to effectuate the prayers (including the use of the school 
grounds and the public address system). 
 29.  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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cutouts . . .”30  It also included a crèche with approximately life-
size human figures, including the baby Jesus.31  Several citizens 
claimed the crèche “offended their interest in the separation of 
church and state.”32  Most dramatically, named plaintiff Daniel 
Donnelly claimed the display induced a state of “fear.”33 
The Court dismissed these concerns and declared that the 
crèche was merely a small part of a secular holiday display.34  The 
Court noted that the crèche cost the City nothing to maintain, and 
that the crèche was no more coercive than governmental 
recognition of the holiday itself, or the display of Christian 
paintings in federally owned museums.35  In short, mere 
association of an object with a religion was not enough to make it 
an establishment of religion.36 
The Supreme Court issued its two most famous passive 
viewing cases on the same day in 2005: McCreary County v. ACLU 
and Van Orden v. Perry.  The opinions both involved displays of 
the Ten Commandments, with one opinion finding the display 
constitutional (Van Orden) and the other finding the display 
unconstitutional (McCreary County).  The cases illustrate two 
distinctions that have proved decisive in passive viewing 
challenges: (1) whether a complained of object is isolated or part of 
a larger display; and (2) whether the persons who decided to 
display the object expressed religious motives. 
In McCreary County, the ACLU challenged the State of 
Kentucky’s maintenance of the Ten Commandments in two county 
courthouses.37  The McCreary County display was hastily erected 
after the County legislature passed a resolution requiring such a 
display.  McCreary officials specifically requested that the display 
be placed in a “high traffic” area.38  Pulaski County’s display 
opened to great fanfare, complete with a speech by a local Judge’s 
 
 30.  Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1175 (D.R.I. 1981) (district 
court opinion). 
 31.  465 U.S. at 671. 
 32.  525 F. Supp. at 1157. 
 33.  Id. at 1156. 
 34.  465 U.S. at 684-85. 
 35.  Id. at 683. 
 36.  Id. at 685. 
 37.  545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 38.  Id. at 851. 
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pastor on the certainty of God’s existence.39  The Counties made 
no pretense that these were anything but overtly religious 
displays.  The ACLU quickly filed a suit challenging the displays 
as violations of the Establishment Clause.40 
Realizing that a secular rationale was their best argument, 
the Counties’ attorneys hastily assembled a secular justification 
for the displays, arguing that the Commandments were selected 
for display because the Commandments’ ethical wisdom has 
informed, and continues to inform, American law.41  The Supreme 
Court agreed with this reasoning,42  but found that it was a 
“sham.”43  In other words, the Counties’ justifications simply came 
too late.  The Court did not discuss the issue of standing – 
apparently the ACLU’s standing44 to bring the action was 
assumed, or not disputed on appeal. 
The Justices took a more generous view of a Ten 
Commandments display in Van Orden v. Perry.45  This display of 
the Ten Commandments was a large, 6-foot tall monument that 
formed one part of a thirty-eight piece46 display outside of the 
Austin, Texas County Courthouse.  The other displays included 
secular monuments and memorials such as the “Heroes of the 
Alamo, Hoodís Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, [and] Volunteer 
Fireman” memorials.47  Unlike the two Counties involved in 
McCreary Country, no religious fanfare greeted the monument’s 
opening.  The monument had been donated decades ago by the 
Fraternal Order of the Eagles in the hope that it would reduce 
 
 39.  Id. at 851, 869. 
 40.  Id. at 852. 
 41.  Id. at 852-53. 
 42.  Id. at 856. 
 43.  Id. at 865.  While the Court didn’t explicitly call the rationale a 
sham, the Court said that states cannot employ sham reasoning, and that it 
didn’t believe the Counties’ explanation.  One can easily put two and two 
together. 
 44.  So long as any member of an organization has standing and the 
organization represents this person’s interests, the organization has standing 
under the Constitution.  The counties challenged the ACLU’s standing at the 
trial level, and the District Court held that the ACLU had organizational 
standing.  The Counties either dropped this argument on appeal, or 
stipulated to it before the Supreme Court. 
 45.  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 46.  Composed of “17 monuments and 21 historical markers.”  Id. at 681. 
 47.  Id. at n.1. 
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juvenile delinquency.48  This history satisfied the Court that the 
monuments were constitutionally permissible because there was 
no evidence of any religious intent.  Furthermore, the displays 
were part of a larger display containing secular objects.  As in 
McCreary County, the Court failed to address whether the 
plaintiff, Thomas Van Orden, had standing to bring the action 
based simply on observing the monument.49 
III. AHLQUIST V. CITY OF CRANSTON 
The story of Ahlquist begins 50 years ago, when the banner in 
question was first displayed at Cranston West High School.50  
Cranston West was opened in 1959 to support Cranston’s growing 
population and is one of the City’s two high schools.51  From its 
inception, Cranston West was no stranger to expressions of 
Christian faith.  Classes began with a recitation of the Lord’s 
Prayer until the U.S. Supreme Court disapproved of such prayers 
in its 1962 decision Engel v. Vitale.52  Similarly, the prayer banner 
at issue  was raised four years after the school opened. 53  It was 
donated by the Class of 1963,54 the first class to graduate from 
Cranston West.55 
The banner’s message is not overtly religious and does not 
reference the text of the Bible.  It is primarily concerned with 
secular aspirations, such as the ability “to grow mentally and 
 
 48.  Sylvia Moreno, “Supreme Court on a Shoestring: Homeless Man 
Takes On Texas, Religious Display”, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 21, 2005 at A01, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40461-2005 
Feb20.html (last accessed Oct. 19, 2012).  The Eagles donated similar 
displays to courthouses around the country.  Id.  The precise link between the 
presence of the Commandments and a decrease in juvenile delinquency is 
unclear.  My best guess is the Eagles hoped the monument would instill the 
fear of God in wayward youth. 
 49.  Van Orden suggested that his decision to file the lawsuit was, in 
part, due to an overabundance of free time.  Van Orden was a former 
attorney who, after a personal breakdown, became homeless.  He told the 
Washington Post that he brought suit since his “schedule [wa]s kind of light.”  
Moreno, supra note 48. 
 50.  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 840 F.Supp.2d 507, 511 (D.R.I. 2012). 
 51.  Id. at 510 
 52.  Id. at 511; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 53.  Ahlquist,  480 F. Supp. 2d at 511. 
 54. Id. 
 55.  Id. at 510. 
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morally” and “to be kind and helpful.”56  It does, however, include 
two religious phrases: “Our Heavenly Father” and “Amen.”  It 
measures about 8 feet in height, and is painted directly on to the 
wall of the school’s gymnasium.  It reads, in its entirety: 
SCHOOL PRAYER 
OUR HEAVENLY FATHER, 
GRANT US EACH DAY THE DESIRE TO DO OUR BEST, 
TO GROW MENTALLY AND MORALLY AS WELL AS 
PHYSICALLY, 
 
TO BE KIND AND HELPFUL TO OUR CLASSMATES AND 
TEACHERS, 
TO BE HONEST WITH OURSELVES AS WELL AS WITH 
OTHERS, 
HELP US TO BE GOOD SPORTS AND SMILE WHEN WE 
LOSE AS WELL AS WHEN WE WIN, 
TEACH US THE VALUE OF TRUE FRIENDSHIP, 
HELP US ALWAYS TO CONDUCT OURSELVES SO AS TO 
BRING CREDIT TO CRANSTON HIGH SCHOOL WEST. 
 
AMEN57 
 
Jessica Ahlquist entered Cranston West as a freshman in the 
summer of 2009.58  Ahlquist attended several mandatory school 
events in the auditorium, but did not notice the prayer banner 
until a friend pointed it out to her.59  An avowed atheist,60 
Ahlquist testified that the religious language in the banner grew 
to bother her: “It seemed like it was saying, every time I saw it, 
‘You don’t belong here.’”61  Ahlquist contacted the ACLU, who told 
her that it had already received an anonymous complaint about 
the banner.62  She decided to start a discussion about the issue, 
 
 56.  Id. at 511. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 512. 
 59.  Id. 
 60. Abby Goodnough, “Student Faces Town’s Wrath in Protest Against a 
Prayer”, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2012/01/27/us/rhode-island-city-enraged-over-school-prayer-
lawsuit.html?_r=0 (last accessed Oct. 19, 2012). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
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creating a Facebook page dedicated to a discussion of the prayer 
mural.63 
The ACLU wrote a letter to Cranston officials in July of 2010 
requesting that the banner be taken down.64  In response, the 
Cranston School Committee organized several public hearings on 
the issue.65  The hearings were, to say the least, acrimonious. 
Members of the Cranston community, including religious officials, 
community members, and Ahlquist voiced their opinions on the 
banner.  Community members generally supported the mural’s 
continued presence.66  Two religious officials and Ahlquist 
recommended that the mural be removed.67  Several others 
equivocated, indicating that they supported the mural, but did not 
want the City to become embroiled in costly litigation.68 
A significant amount of the U.S. District Court’s opinion in 
Ahlquist is devoted to the conduct of the public at these 
hearings.69  Although it did not mention Clarence Darrow or 
William Jennings Bryan, the Court likened the public meetings to 
the famed “Scopes monkey trial” of 1925.70  The Court was not 
entirely unjustified: the record of the town meetings is replete 
with off-the-cuff, dogmatic comments.71  Indeed, in response to 
Ahlquist’s comments, a member of the community said: “[i]f people 
 
 63.  Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (D.R.I. 2012). 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 512-16 (discussing the Town Meetings). 
 66.  See, e.g., id. 
 67.  Id. at 512-13 (recommendations of Dr. Donald Anderson, Executive 
Minister of the Rhode Island State Council of Churches and Rabbi Amy Levin 
of Temple Torat Yisrael in Cranston);  Id. at 516 (recommendation of 
Ahlquist). 
 68.  See, e.g., id. at 514-16. 
 69.  Id. at 512-16. 
 70.  Tennessee v. Scopes, more popularly known as the “Scopes Monkey 
Trial”, was a criminal prosecution of John T. Scopes for teaching the theory of 
evolution in a Tennessee classroom.  The trial, then and now, was a circus.  
Famed defense attorney Clarence Darrow represented Scopes, and populist 
William Jennings Bryan prosecuted the case (he had not tried a case in 
decades).  The case is significant for the divisions it exposed: northern versus 
southern, urban versus rural, and science versus religion.  Scopes was found 
guilty and fined $100, although this was overturned on appeal.  The trial was 
the subject of Jerome Lawrence and Robert Edwin Lee’s 1955 play, Inherit 
the Wind.  See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, DON’T KNOW MUCH ABOUT 
HISTORY 337-38 (2011). 
 71.  Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 513-14. 
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want to be Atheist, it’s their choice and they can go to hell . . .”72  
Another said: “If you take the banner down, you are spitting in the 
face of Almighty God.”73  The comments cited in the Court’s 
opinion do not paint a flattering portrait of the banner’s 
supporters. 
The result of the meetings was that the prayer banner would 
remain,74  but it was to be accompanied by an explanatory marker 
indicating that the banner was historical, and not intended to 
“promot[e] any ethnic, political, or religious [view].”75  Unsatisfied 
with this compromise, the ACLU contacted Ahlquist and asked if 
she would serve as the named plaintiff in an action against the 
City of Cranston.  Ahlquist agreed.76  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston 
was filed on April 4, 2011.77 
A.  The Court’s Opinion 
The District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that 
the Prayer Banner was constitutionally impermissible and 
ordered its removal.  The Court’s analysis is divided into two 
sections: (1) Ahlquist’s standing to bring her claim; and (2) the 
constitutionality of the banner under the Establishment Clause.  
These issues are analyzed below. 
1.  Standing 
All litigants who bring actions in federal court must 
demonstrate that they have standing to bring a claim.  In order to 
prove that they have standing to bring a claim, litigants must 
demonstrate three factors: (1) an “injury in fact” (an injury 
recognized by the law as legitimate);78 (2) redressability 
 
 72.  Id. at 513. 
 73.  Id. at 514. 
 74.  Id. at 515. 
 75.  Id. at 516. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. The case could have brought in State or Federal Court – Ahlquist 
and the ACLU most likely chose federal court since a decision would be 
issued faster (state courts are notoriously slow compared to their federal 
counterparts).  Additionally, the federal forum may have been seen as 
advantageous for Ahlquist, as a state court might feel more loyalty toward 
the banner. 
 78.  Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 
(1970). 
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(allegations showing that a judicial decision would resolve the 
problem alleged); and (3) causation (facts proving that the 
defendant’s activity caused the alleged injury).79 This requirement 
is derived from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which provides 
that federal courts may only hear “case[s]” or “controvers[ies].”80  
Standing is not simply a box to be checked when a plaintiff claims 
he or she was harmed – it is an important method of ensuring that 
claims satisfy the Constitution’s minimal requirements.  More 
broadly speaking, it  helps “maintain [ ] the public’s confidence in 
an unelected but restrained Federal Judiciary.”81 
The defendants argued that Ahlquist did not suffer an injury 
in fact by merely viewing the mural.  Defendants advanced two 
reasons in support of their argument.  First, Ahlquist admitted in 
sworn testimony that she did not notice the mural until a friend 
pointed it out to her.  Even after Ahlquist became aware of the 
mural, she testified that she didn’t “really think much about it at 
first.”82  Second, Ahlquist admitted in a radio interview that she 
was not actually offended by the mural, but merely opposed to it 
because she thought it was unconstitutional.83  Ahlquist, in 
response, argued that her psychological injury (namely, feeling 
“upset,” “exclu[ded],” and “ostraciz[ed]”) was legitimate and, 
further, the kind of injury deemed sufficient in Establishment 
Clause cases.84 
The District Court resolved the issue by consulting federal 
case law on the issue of standing.85  This case law delineates the 
rules for cases on either end of the injury spectrum.  On the one 
hand, those litigants who allege a “personal stake in the outcome” 
have been found to have standing.86  On the other hand, those 
litigants who have endured “the psychological consequence . . . 
 
 79.  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982);  see also Robert J. 
Pushaw Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons 
From Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 80.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 81.  Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 
1436, 1442 (2011). 
 82.  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 840 F.Supp.2d 507, 517 (D.R.I. 2012). 
 83.  Id. at 516. 
 84.  Id. at 512. 
 85.  See id. at 517-20. 
 86.  Id. at 517 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders v. Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 
(1992)). 
MORTON BENTLEY DESKTOPPED WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2013  9:35 AM 
2013] SEEING ISN’T BELIEVING 185 
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees” do 
not.87  As one might expect, most cases fall somewhere between 
these poles. 
In determining whether Ahlquist endured a legitimate injury, 
the Court first declared that the Supreme Court’s statements on 
standing were conflicted and of little help.  Rather than “cherry 
pick” phrases from Supreme Court’s opinion, wrote Judge Laguex, 
the Court would analyze how the issue of standing played out in 
practice.88  The Court looked at five opinions, three that rejected 
standing, and two that endorsed it.89 
The Court first looked at Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a 
challenge under the Administrative Procedures Act to actions 
taken by the U.S. Department of the Interior.  The plaintiffs, a 
group of environmental and conservation groups, challenged the 
government’s determination that the Endangered Species Act did 
not apply abroad.90  The plaintiffs claimed that they were injured 
because they had traveled, and planned to return, to foreign 
countries.91  The Supreme Court ruled that this was insufficient to 
establish standing, since the plaintiffs’ connection to the countries 
in question was merely aspirational.  Since the plaintiffs had no 
connection to the foreign destinations, a governmental decision 
directed toward those countries would not injure the plaintiffs in a 
legal sense.92 
Next, the Court turned to two Establishment Clause cases 
denying standing.  First was Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow,93 a father’s complaint against a school district for forcing 
his daughter to recite the Pledge of Allegiance’s “under God” 
clause.94  This case was dismissed by the Supreme Court on a 
technicality: the child’s mother filed a motion to intervene in the 
case, stating that she was the daughter’s legal guardian and that 
neither she nor her daughter opposed the recitation of the pledge.  
Thus, Newdow proved little help in deciding what should be made 
 
 87.  Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)). 
 88.  Id. at 518. 
 89.  Id. at 518-19. 
 90.  Id. at 518. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 94.  Id. at 5. 
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of the prayer banner. 
The second challenge, Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State95, revolved 
around the issue of taxpayer standing to bring Establishment 
Clause challenges.  The plaintiff in Valley Forge was an 
organization composed of 90,000 “taxpayers” with no connection to 
the facts of the litigation, save the fact that its members’ taxes 
paid for a transfer of federal land to a bible college.96  The Valley 
Forge Court dismissed the organization’s complaints as 
generalized grievances unworthy of judicial consideration.97 
The Court then considered two active endorsement cases 
where the Court found standing.  First was Abington School 
District v. Schemp,98 a challenge to a Pennsylvania law requiring 
that ten passages from the Bible were read every morning of each 
public school day.  These passages were read by a student via a 
public address broadcast that  all students were required to listen 
to.99  The Court, with little rationalizing, declared that the 
students’ required presence “surely suffice[d] to give [the plaintiff] 
standing.”100  Next was Engel v. Vitale101, a similar challenge by 
ten students to a prayer read each school day in New York’s public 
schools.  The prayer began with “Almighty God” and ended with 
“Amen.”102  The Court did not even mention standing in its 
opinion; it simply took it for granted.103 
Finally, the Court turned to the case that best supported its 
argument: Lee v. Weisman.104  The plaintiff in Lee was a student 
in Providence, Rhode Island who complained of an upcoming 
graduation speech that would include an “invocation and 
benediction” by a religious official.  The Court found standing 
based on two factors: (1) the student’s current enrollment at 
 
 95.  454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
 96.  Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
 97.  Id.  Were this an Establishment Clause case, taxpayer standing 
would likely have sufficed.  See infra discussion of taxpayer standing in part 
IV. 
 98.  374 U.S. 203 (1963).  This case is described above in part II. 
 99.  Id. at 206-07. 
 100.  Id. at 224. 
 101.  370 U.S. 421 (1962).  This case is described above in part II. 
 102.  See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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Classical High School in Providence; and (2) the likelihood, if not 
certainty, that the invocation and benediction would take place at 
her graduation.105  Thus, like the plaintiffs in Shemp and Engel, 
the student would be present at a school event featuring religious 
speech. 
Considering these cases, the Ahlquist Court threw its lot in 
with the cases that found standing.  Judge Lageux expressed 
confidence that the Supreme Court would find standing here, 
arguing that Ahlquist endured an injury similar to those endured 
by the plaintiffs in Schemp, Engel, and Lee.106  Further, Judge 
Lageux found Ahlquist’s situation “readily distinguishable” from 
the plaintiffs in Lujan, Valley Forge, and Elk Grove.107  Having 
found standing, the Court analyzed the permissibility of the 
prayer banner under the Establishment Clause. 
2.   The Prayer Banner 
The Ahlquist Court, in no uncertain terms, found the prayer 
banner unconstitutional.  To reach that point, the Court waded 
through the clutter that is the Supreme Court’s body of 
Establishment Clause case law.  Relying on a recent First Circuit 
opinion,108 the Court analyzed the following factors: (1) The three-
pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman; (2) an “endorsement” 
analysis derived from Lynch v. Donnelly;109 and (3) a “coercion” 
analysis derived from Lee v. Weisman.110 
 a. Lemon Test 
As a starting point, the Court applied the venerable yet oft-
criticized Lemon v. Kurtzman test.111  This test has three parts.  
First, the test asks whether the governmental policy (or display) 
in question reflects a clearly secular purpose.  The Ahlquist Court 
 
 105.  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 840 F.Supp.2d 507, 524 (D.R.I. 2012) 
(quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 584). 
 106.  Id. at 520. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Interestingly, the case the Court relied upon, Freedom From Religion 
Found. v. Hanover School District, held that the words “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance do not make the Pledge an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.  626 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 109.  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 110.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 111.  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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concluded that it did not.112  Although several members of the 
school board  expressed support for the banner based on values 
such as  “conveying moral values to high school students[,] . . . 
history and tradition[, and] . . . respecting each student’s 
contributions to the school”, two members’ explicit endorsement of 
the banner based on religious grounds doomed the defendants’ 
argument.113  Since Lemon requires a “clearly” secular purpose, 
the Court had little trouble concluding that Cranston West’s 
motivations in maintaining the banner were not wholly secular.114 
The Court also suggested that the mural’s donation and 
initial display was “clearly religious.”  But despite the fact that 
the banner includes the phrases “our heavenly father” and 
“Amen”, there is no evidence of the motivations underlying the 
banner’s creation.115  The Court also suggested that Cranston 
West’s decision to display the prayer mural in 1963 was a 
deliberate snub at the Supreme Court, since Cranston was forced 
to eliminate mandatory school prayer following the Court’s 1962 
opinion in Engel v. Vitale.116 This, however, is a matter of 
speculation: it is equally likely that Cranston West officials 
deemed the banner religiously innocuous. 
Next, the Court asked whether the mural has the “primary 
effect of advancing or hindering religion.”117  The Court stated 
that “[t]o the extent the installation . . . has an[y] effect, its impact 
is to advance religion.”118  This is a curious statement since, as 
with the circumstances surrounding the banner’s donation, there 
does not appear to be evidence one way or the other.  Indeed, the 
most that can be said is that Ahlquist (and possibly others) 
disapproved of the banner.  Perhaps motivated by this dearth of 
evidence, the Court speculated as to the motivations of the 
banner’s supporters: “[t]he retention of the Prayer Mural . . . 
reflects the nostalgia felt by some members of the community who 
remember fondly when . . . religion . . . could be practiced in public 
schools with impunity.”119 
 
 112.  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 840 F.Supp.2d 507, 521 (D.R.I. 2012). 
 113.  Id. at 521. 
 114.  Id. at 522. 
 115.  Id. at 521. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at 522. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id. at 522. 
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The Court delivered its coup-de-grâce by explaining why 
Cranston failed to “avoid excessive entanglement with religion.”120  
The Court found Cranston’s actions, vis-à-vis the School 
Committee members’ conduct, “troubling.”121  The Court was 
unimpressed by the rowdy and boorish comments at the public 
meetings.  Of course, these comments came almost exclusively 
from members of the public, not school officials.122  However, the 
Court linked the School Committee members to the melee by 
pointing out that five of the members “expressed avowals of their 
own religious beliefs.”123 
Finally, the Court chastised the School Board for creating 
“civic divisiveness” by “focus[ing] on the Prayer Mural” and 
“exposing [themselves] to a situation where a loud and passionate 
majority encouraged [them] to . . . override the constitutional 
rights of a minority.”124  This is a curious statement, given that 
Ahlquist and an unnamed complainant could equally be said to 
have initiated the civic divisiveness by contacting the ACLU and 
filing a lawsuit.  The Supreme Court expressly disapproved of the 
Ahlquist court’s rationale in the 1984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly: 
“apart from this litigation there is no evidence of political friction 
or divisiveness over the [complained of object] . . . A litigant 
cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit . . . create the 
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of 
entanglement.”125 
 b. Endorsement 
The Court next conducted an “endorsement” analysis, asking 
if Cranston’s actions had “the purpose or effect of endorsing, or 
promoting religion.”126  This test is derived from former Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in the case of Lynch v. 
Donnelly.127  While largely duplicative of the Lemon test, the First 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). 
 126.  Id. at 714. 
 127.  See Raymond C. Pierce, The First Amendment “Undergod”: 
Reviewing the Coercion Test in Establishment of Religion Claims, 35 HAMLINE 
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Circuit has identified it as a separate analysis.128  After describing 
Ahlquist’s feelings of dejection and ostracization, the Court 
clarified that the test asks if “a reasonable and objective observer 
fully aware of the background and circumstances . . .  would view 
the Prayer Mural and the conduct of the School Committee [as an 
endorsement of religion].”129 
The Court found that an objective observer would deem the 
banner and the School Committee’s conduct endorsements of 
Christianity.130  It reached this conclusion by engaging in the 
temporal feat of analyzing the mural “at three points in time”: the 
time of the banner’s creation, the period between 1963 – 2011, and 
the time of the School Committee meetings.131  The Court 
concluded that a reasonable observer would discern religious 
intentions when the banner was first displayed, not draw an 
opinion one way or the other during the intervening years, and 
again feel that the banner was an endorsement around the time of 
the School Committee hearings.132  The Court did not explain how 
or why an observer would have realized the mural’s religious 
intent in 1963, but nevertheless concluded that there was 
sufficient endorsement of religion. 
 c. Coercion 
The Ahlquist Court also examined the degree of coercion 
imposed by the banner.  The “coercion” test is derived from 
language in Lee v. Weisman, discussed above.133  The coercion 
here, the Court admitted, was minimal to non-existent.  
Nevertheless, the Court declared that courts must employ 
“heightened sensitivity” when examining religion in public 
schools, and, further, that the facts of this case demanded 
“heightened scrutiny.”134  The Supreme Court has indeed 
indicated that public school children deserve special protection 
under the Establishment Clause.  The Court’s rationale is that 
 
L. REV. 183, 188 (2012). 
 128.  Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d. at 521. 
 129.  Id. at 523. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See Pierce, supra note 127, at 189. 
 134. Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507, 524. 
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young people feel more social pressure to conform than adults do; 
thus, children are more easily susceptible to conform to religious 
practices observed at school.135  This rationale was developed in 
the active endorsement context, and makes less sense when 
applied to a passive viewing situation like Ahlquist.  Nevertheless, 
in the spirit of affording special protection to children, the Court 
sided with Ahlquist.136 
 d. Public Displays 
Finally, the Court bolstered its analysis with a closer look at 
Establishment Clause litigation involving religious displays in 
public places.  The Court focused on two of the most significant 
opinions: Van Orden v. Perry137 and Stone v. Graham.138  Both 
opinions involved publicly sponsored displays of the Ten 
Commandments.  Van Orden involved a public display on the 
grounds of the Texas State Capitol, while Stone involved a 
mandatory display of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky 
classrooms.139  The only real distinction that can be drawn 
between the cases – as the Ahlquist Court noted – is that Stone 
involved a public school system.  As noted above, the Supreme 
Court has often suggested that religious displays in public schools 
should be afforded special treatment due to the impressionability 
of youth.  The Court offered a final, lengthy quote from Rhode 
Island’s most famous inhabitant, Roger Williams, before ordering 
the removal of the banner.140 
3.  The Aftermath 
Although litigation promises finality, it often opens new, or 
exacerbates existing, wounds.  This was the case with Ahlquist.  
 
 135.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992). 
 136.  Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 137.  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 138.  449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 139.  Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25. 
 140.  See id. at 525-26. (“There goes many a ship to sea . . . whose weal 
and woe is common . . .  It hath fallen out sometimes, that both Papists and 
Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked on one ship; upon which 
supposal, I affirm that all the liberty of conscience I ever pleaded for, turns 
upon these two hinges, that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks 
be forced to come to the ship’s prayers or worship, nor compelled from their 
own particular prayers or worship, if they practice any.”). 
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The most prominent victim was Ahlquist herself.  Ahlquist 
received death threats141 and online smears.142 A Rhode Island 
State Senator, Peter J. Palumbo, called Ahlquist an “evil little 
thing.”143  Opponents and classmates sent Ahlquist cruel 
messages, saying she was, for example, “unloved” and “psycho.”144 
The campaign against Ahlquist became so heated that she was 
accompanied to school by an armed guard for a period.  Even three 
local florists refused to deliver flowers to Ahlquist based on her 
outspoken opposition to the mural.145  This conduct is deplorable 
and inexcusable.  One cannot help but note the irony that those 
who support the magnanimous message of the Cranston West 
Prayer Banner would engage in such tactics.  Quoth the banner: 
“Help us to be good sports and smile when we lose as well as when 
we win.” 
The City of Cranston decided not to appeal Judge Lagueux’s 
opinion.146  Perhaps the most compelling reason to end the 
litigation was to cut off future legal costs.  Cranston most likely 
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars defending itself.147  
Additionally, the City and School District were required to pay the 
 
 141.  See Maria Armental, “Cranston police investigate threats to student 
who sued over Cranston West prayer banner”, PROV. J. BULL, (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2012/04/cranston-police-
31.html (Ahlquist received a handwritten letter in February of 2012 
threatening her with “bodily harm and sexual assault”). 
 142.  Mark Schieldrop, Ahlquist: Fight over Mural, Despite Harrassment, 
Threats, “Worth It.”, CRANSTONPATCH, (Jan. 16, 2012), http://cranston. 
patch.com/articles/ahlquist-fight-over-mural-despite-harrassment-threats-
worth-it. 
 143.  Goodnough, supra note 60. 
 144.  Elisabeth Harrison, R.I. Student Draws Ire Over School Prayer 
Challenge, NPR NEWS, (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/14 
6538958/rhode-island-district-weighs-students-prayer-lawsuit. 
 145.  Paul Davis, Florist Found in Connecticut to Deliver Roses to 
Cranston West Prayer Banner Opponent, PROJ. J. BULL., (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2012/01/cranston-
floris.html. 
 146.  News Staff, Cranston school prayer banner: Panel won't appeal 
ruling, PROV. J. BULL., (Feb. 16, 2012), http://news.providencejournal.com 
/breaking-news/2012/02/cranston-school-13.html. 
 147.  An article in the Providence Journal suggested that the cost of 
appealing the District Court’s opinion alone might reach $500,000.  See Paul 
Davis, Cranston School Prayer Banner: Appeal Could Cost $500,000, Lawyer 
Says, Prov. J. Bull., (Feb. 16, 2012), http://news.providencejournal.com 
/breaking-news/2012/02/cranston-school-12.html. 
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ACLU $150,000 in legal fees because Ahlquist prevailed.148  Many 
members of the public did not want to give up so easily.  As late as 
March, a group of seven intervenors appealed to the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals to secure their right to intervene and, thus, 
appeal the decision.149  This proved unsuccessful and the banner 
was removed on March 3 and 4 of 2012.150  The process took 11 
hours, and involved physically removing a section of the wall 
containing the banner.  In an Indiana Jones-like ending, the 
Providence Journal reported that the Prayer Banner is now “being 
preserved at an undisclosed location.”151 
IV. REJECTING PASSIVE VIEWING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
CHALLENGES 
A.  Introduction 
What was the Ahlquist opinion all about?  The District Court 
cast it as a tale of religious zealotry gone amok.  Ahlquist was a 
brave dissenter who challenged a visible symbol of a City’s 
endorsement of Christianity.152  However, Ahlquist’s lawsuit can 
also be cast as a thinly veiled complaint about the City of 
 
 148.  Lynn Arditi, Cranston, Schools to Split Legal Fees in Prayer Banner 
Case, PROV. J. BULL, (Apr. 23, 2012), http://news.providencejournal.com 
/breaking-news/2012/04/cranston-school-17.html. 
 149.  News Staff, Group Seeks to Reopen Cranston Prayer Banner Case, 
PROV. J. BULL, (May 14, 2012), http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-
news/2012/05/group-seeks-to-2.html. 
 150.  Meg Fraser, Prayer Banner Comes Down, CRANSTON HERALD, (Mar. 
7, 2012), http://www.cranstononline.com/ stories/Prayer-mural-comes- 
down,68657?search_filter=cranston+prayer+banner&town_id=3&sub_type=st
ories. 
 151.  See Arditi, supra note 148.  In the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark, 
swashbuckling archaeologist Indiana Jones (played by Harrison Ford), 
pursues the “Ark of the Covenant”, a legendary artifact containing the tablets 
inscribed with the Ten Commandments handed down to Moses on Mt. Sinai. 
Raiders Of The Lost Ark (Paramount 
Pictures 1981).The Ark is eventually discovered and possesses unfathomable 
power.  American governmental officials confiscate the Ark and, in the 
movie’s final scene, the Ark is wheeled into a vast warehouse, presumably 
never to be seen again.  See id. 
 152.  For an even rosier iteration of this argument, see Charles Haynes, In 
Rhode Island, a Lesson in Religious Freedom, WASH. POST, (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/post/in-rhode-island-a-lesson-
in-religious-freedom/2012/01/24/gIQAlcXJOQ_blog.html. 
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Cranston’s religious homogeneity.153  Under this view, the banner 
is neither here nor there – it was simply a tool for opportunist 
individuals and organizations to win a skirmish in the cultural 
battle over public references to Christianity. 
If this is the correct interpretation – and I argue that it is – 
then we must seriously question the continued wisdom of passive 
viewing cases.  I am not convinced that challenges such as 
Ahlquist’s154 involve an establishment of religion.  These 
situations involve the voluntary, passive viewing of objects with 
religious significance.  The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
compelled or encouraged attendance at events containing religious 
material constitutes a state establishment of religion.  This is 
reasonable given the inherent coercion in forcing children to speak 
or listen to religious speech.  However, objects containing religious 
language that can be found in public institutions do not involve 
any coercion and should not, in my view, constitute an 
establishment of religion.  My primary argument is that these 
complaints violate the constitutional mandate of standing.  There 
are plaintiffs who could have a valid claim to standing, but not 
passive viewers.  Additionally, I offer some specific critiques of the 
Ahlquist Court opinion. 
 
 153.  The City of Cranston is a largely Catholic community.  One websites 
place the Catholic population at well above 40%.  See Sperling’s Best Places, 
http://www.bestplaces.net/religion/city/rhode_island/cranston (last accessed 
Oct. 19, 2012) (43.31% as of June 2012). 
 154.  A case very similar to Ahlquist’s was filed in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Virginia in 2011. Doe 1 v. Sch. Bd. 
of Giles Cnty., No. 7:11-cv-00435-MFU (W.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2011); Complaint, 
Doe 1, No. 7:11-cv-00435-MFU (W.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://acluva.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/20110913GilesCo10Cs 
Doecomplaint.pdf). In that case, students challenged public school displays of 
the Ten Commandments that were erected in the wake of the Columbine 
High School shootings of 1999. According to the complaint, the displays were 
taken down and put back up again a few times. The complaint alleges that 
the School District finally buckled to pressure and approved a compromise 
measure in June of 2012 that would replace the Ten Commandments with a 
photocopy of a history textbook placing the Ten Commandments in historical 
perspective. See Laurence Hammack, Giles County to remove Ten 
Commandments from Narrows High School, THE ROANOKE TIMES (Jun. 1, 
2012), http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/309612. See also 
Christopher J. Heaney, Cooking Up a New Lemon Test: The Establishment 
Clause, Displays of Religious Objects, and Lessons From India, 10 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 559, 597-605 (2012). 
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B.  Standing 
As Ahlquist illustrates, standing is often given short shrift in 
Establishment Clause cases.  Standing is a constitutional 
mandate that cannot be waived or overlooked.  Yet this is exactly 
what many federal courts do.  As noted above, courts have found 
standing simply based on a person’s claim that he or she saw 
something with a religious theme and was offended.  The 
argument that these passive viewings constitute legally 
redressable injuries is dubious.  At best, these claims produce a 
psychological disagreement, which is insufficient according to 
Supreme Court case law.155 
It seems clear that plaintiffs like Ahlquist do not, as required 
by the Constitution, suffer an injury sufficient to confer standing.  
In a thorough and insightful examination of this issue, 
Commentator Mary Alexander Myers observed that a Court’s 
determination of standing “often turns on seemingly arbitrary 
factors such as whether the plaintiff is . . . in public school or how 
often the plaintiff encounters religious displays . . .”156  More 
succinctly, Ms. Myers described the Court’s collective decisions as 
“inconsistent and irrational.”157  Faced with this difficulty, 
however, Ms. Myers recommends that the Court hear the vast 
majority of psychological injuries, at least in the Establishment 
Clause context.  While I agree with Ms. Myers’ analysis, I disagree 
with her conclusion.  I believe it is impossible to validate 
psychological injuries in light of the constitutional imperative to 
only decide “case[s]” or “controvers[ies].”  Thus, the only 
constitutionally permissible way to get around this problem is to 
more carefully police Establishment Clause claims. 
The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that mere 
psychological disagreement is not enough to confer standing.  One 
cannot escape the conclusion that the most Ahlquist suffered was 
a psychological harm, if anything.  Ahlquist viewed the banner a 
 
 155.  Ahlquist v. City of Cranston ex rel. Strom, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507, 518-
19 (D.R.I. 2012) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United 
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 465 (1982)). 
 156.  Mary Alexander Myers, Standing on the Edge: Standing Doctrine 
and the Injury Requirement at the Borders of Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence, 65 VAND. L. REV. 979, 982 (2012). 
 157.  Id. at 982-83, 1003-04. 
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few times, and admitted that she did not notice it until a friend 
pointed it out.  Further to the point, she admitted that she was not 
offended by the banner, but only wanted to vindicate her 
constitutional rights.  This should not be recognized as a legally 
sufficient injury. 
In response, it could be argued that barring certain 
Establishment Clause lawsuits insulates overtly religious displays 
from lawsuits.  I offer two points in response.  First, in a battle 
between a constitutional mandate (standing) and social policy 
(Establishment Clause litigation), social policies must yield to the 
Constitution.  Second, excluding passive viewing cases would not 
prevent persons with a more direct injury from bringing suit.  For 
example, if taxpayer money is used to purchase a religious object 
that is publicly displayed, a taxpayer could bring suit based on his 
or her status as a taxpayer. 
Remitting one’s income taxes is not usually sufficient to 
establish standing; however, the Supreme Court carved out an 
exception for Establishment Clause cases in the 1963 case of Flast 
v. Cohen.158  The Flast Court set out general principles about 
when a taxpayer has standing, and confined its holding to the 
Establishment Clause context.  This exception remains the law 
today.159  One can imagine other circumstances giving rise to a 
personal injury – for example, if a community created a religious 
display as a deliberate attempt to alienate or target a religious 
minority. 
Beyond the issue of standing, the Ahlquist opinion is 
problematic for broader reasons that illustrate the deficiencies of 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  I 
address some of these problems below. 
C.  Ahlquist and the Establishment Clause 
Perhaps the most peculiar part of the Ahlquist opinion is that 
 
 158.  392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 159.  The Flast exception was arguably weakened by the Supreme Court’s 
2011 opinion in Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 
1436, 1439 (2011).  Winn involved a taxpayer challenge to tax breaks given to 
individuals who donate money to school tuition organizations that, in turn, 
occasionally offer scholarships to private religious schools.  Id.  The Court 
held that the policy in question was a tax credit, and not a governmental 
expenditure.  See id. at 1447.  
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it attributed religious motives to the raising of the prayer banner 
when there is no evidence of Cranston’s motives in this regard.  
The Supreme Court has consistently focused on the motivations of 
public entities when they created or displayed objects with 
religious language or themes.  Indeed, it was the sole factor that 
produced different outcomes in McCreary County and Van Orden.  
And yet, the Ahlquist Court glossed over this distinction and 
found that contemporary religious support for the banner was 
good enough.  Clearly the message the Ahlquist Court gathered 
from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence was that any expression 
of religious faith is anathema to a display or activity.  This is far 
too demanding a standard. 
Another problematic aspect of the Ahlquist opinion is its 
insistence that children – students, specifically – receive different 
treatment under the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly suggested that Courts must exercise additional 
sensitivity to ensure that children are not exposed to religious 
displays.  This rule has no basis in the Constitution and is bad 
policy. 
The Supreme Court’s rationale is that children are especially 
susceptible to religious messages that the impartial state should 
not be promoting.  The Court has even referenced psychological 
studies that support this claim.160  This argument, however, is 
flawed for several reasons.  First, the term “children” encompasses 
a group with a substantial range in age and cognitive ability.  
Second, the Court has assumed that students are smart enough to 
draw the required inferences connecting the school to an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion, but not smart enough 
to avoid being brainwashed by such efforts.  Children are not 
impressionable vessels who cannot think for themselves.  Ahlquist 
is living proof: she was only fourteen at the time she complained 
to the ACLU.161  Third, the Court ignores the fact that children 
are accustomed to engaging in mandatory behavior that they do 
not give much thought to.  Not everyone who speaks “under God” 
in the Pledge of Allegiance or views an object with references to a 
 
 160.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). 
 161.  See Goodnough, supra note 60 (Ahlquist was sixteen as of January 
16, 2012). 
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Supreme Deity thinks much of it.162 
Finally, it bears mentioning that Establishment Clause 
lawsuits like Ahlquist’s are often resolved according to the 
political affiliation of the judge hearing the case.163  A recent 
study by Professors Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise of 
Establishment Clause cases from 1996 – 2005 found that 
Democratic-appointed judges upheld 57.3 percent of 
Establishment Clause challenges,  while Republican-appointed 
judges upheld 25.4 percent of challenges.164  In other words, an 
Establishment Clause challenge heard before a Democratically-
elected Judge is 2.25 times more likely to succeed.165  The authors 
noted that the malleable nature of Supreme Court case law gives 
judges intellectual wiggle-room to find in favor of the party 
representing his or her political beliefs.166  While a plaintiff can 
choose a federal or state forum for his or her Establishment 
Clause claim, the decision about which judge will hear the case is 
often left to the Court’s internal rules.  This creates the potential 
for even more uncertainty. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ahlquist opinion illustrates three problems that are 
endemic to Establishment Clause litigation.  First, Ahlquist 
ignores the standing requirements imposed by the Constitution.  
Second, it recognizes a special rule for religious displays in public 
 
 162.  Justice Potter Stewart got at the strange nature of the adult/child 
distinction in his dissent in Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421, 450, n.20  (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) (“[I]s the Court suggesting that the Constitution permits 
judges and Congressmen and Presidents to join in prayer, but prohibits 
school children from doing so?”). 
 163.  This was not the case in Ahlquist: Judge Lagueux was nominated by 
Republican President Ronald Reagan.  See Biography of Senior Judge Ronald 
R. Lagueux, http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/menu/judges/judicialofficers/ 
lagueux.html (last accessed March 20, 2013).  Judges, however, have 
motivations besides political ones.  Judge Lagueux has served the Rhode 
Island State and Federal Judiciary for over forty years, and has been a Senior 
Judge since 2001.  Id.  Most people, toward the end of their career, would 
rather defend the venerable principle of separation of church and state 
instead of tacitly endorsing the hostility expressed toward Ahlquist.  
 164.  Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?  An 
Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in Federal Courts, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2012). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
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schools, a rule nowhere to be found in the text of the Constitution.  
Third, it reiterates the message that an object containing any 
language invoking Christianity is unconstitutional. 
The District Court had Roger Williams on its side, and I have 
chosen my intellectual company accordingly.  The late professor 
and historian Leonard W. Levy wrote a book on the Establishment 
Clause in 1986.  Professor Levy was a proponent of a strict wall of 
separation between church and state.  Yet even Professor Levy 
recognized that lawsuits challenging every reference to a Supreme 
Being were a bit much: 
Some silly suits, such as those seeking to have declared 
unconstitutional the words “under God” in the pledge of 
allegiance or in the money motto “In God We Trust” 
have . . . deleterious effects.  Separationists who cannot 
appreciate of principle of de minimis [violations] ought to 
appreciate a different motto – “Let sleeping dogmas 
lie.”167 
Professor Levy recognized that religion – namely, Christianity 
– is a part of American culture, and attempts to rid American 
culture of any and all mention of it are futile at best, and foolish at 
worst. 
The Establishment Clause has too long been pressed into 
service as a political tool.  Many courts have assisted these efforts 
by ignoring the constitutional mandate of standing.  Rejecting 
passive viewing challenges like Ahlquist would help bring clarity 
and integrity to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
 
 
 167.  Levy, supra note 7, at 177.  Cranston West alumnus Brittany Lanni 
spoke to this as well.  See Goodnough, supra note 60 (Regarding Ahlquist’s 
offense at mention of the divine, Ms. Lanni suggested: “take all the money 
out of your pocket, because every dollar bill says, ‘In God We Trust.’”). 
